| Sourav Mandal ( @ 2008-02-20 09:29:00 |
| Entry tags: | geekery, politics |
The government, encryption and you
I was so busy with liquidating everything in Berkeley I didn't even notice that on November 29, 2007 a federal judge ruled that the 5th amendment protection extends to passphrases. (Coverage and a PDF of the ruling at Volokh.)
The case brings up some interesting issues, both technical and legal:
- This idiot should have used an encryption scheme with plausible deniability, like TrueCrypt. TrueCrypt allows you to create a hidden volume that looks just like the free space, which TrueCrypt fills with random numbers. If you write to the outer volume without also entering the hidden volume passphrase, *poof* the hidden volume data is gone.
The UK can compel passwords under RIPA, and the US can label you an "enemy combatant" and waterboard the outer volume passphrase out of you. With hidden volumes, they'd never know.
(In the case the data is more valuable than the person, one could keep the encryption key on a USB stick or CDROM that he could destroy when threatened by force. But, I don't see why one wouldn't use hidden volumes here, either.) - The discussion comments made by lawyers seem to revolve around several "models" :
- The encrypted volume is like a strong box, and the suspect can be compelled to produce the key
- The encrypted volume is like a safe, and the suspect cannot be compelled to testify to the combination
- The point of the 5th amendment is to prevent false confessions compelled by by torture. In this case, the suspect demonstrated his ability to unlock the volume, so he can be compelled to reproduce this action. It is not testimony because the fact is already established.
- Finally, the one the DOJ came up with, which I must admit is creative: grant transactional immunity for the actual contents of the passphrase (e.g., "I killed Hoffa"), skirting the 5th amendment protection, then go after the suspect for anything incriminating in the data the passphrase unlocks.
- The encrypted volume is like a strong box, and the suspect can be compelled to produce the key
- Potentially in the future, all data and communications will be strongly encrypted and nothing will exist on paper. Should there be an "encryption exception" to the 5th amendment, a la the hearsay exception? This could be useful for, say, cyberterrorism.
It is easy for me to argue "no" for two reasons. First, freedom of expression and privacy come first as a matter of principle. Second, one can use techniques already developed for cracking clandestine organizations: moles, pattern analysis, etc.